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What are the perspectives of the future multipolar world?


Introduction

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the conflict in Ukraine and its international consequences, as well as the growing number of countries from the South asking to join the BRICS, indicate the transition from the unipolar system that emerged at the end of the Cold War to a multipolar world. The BRICS embody a pole of opposition to Western hegemony, with many strengths but also facing a number of limitations, weaknesses and internal contradictions linked to their history, interests, visions and the great power status of Russia, India and China.

The end of the unipolar system

The establishment of a multipolar world order and the shocks that accompany it, or from another point of view the decline of Western hegemony, have been predicted over the past two decades by many authors. Aymeric Chauprade, for example, analysed the rise of the BRICS and their growing role in the international system, as well as the United States' opposition to the creation of any continental European or even Eurasian bloc (the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis championed by Henri de Grossouvre) through NATO.[1] This last point was one of the key elements of the strategy of the United States of America, set out in Zbigniew Brzeziński's famous book[2] and applied since the end of the Cold War.

The emergence of a continental Euro-Russian political and energy bloc[3] was a conscious goal of European countries such as France and Germany, as they were seeking to counterbalance the power of their American ally but also the rising power of China. This desire has materialised in a number of agreements on security in Europe, including the promise to not extend NATO eastwards. Russia hoped the OSCE would become the main regional organisation responsible for a new security architecture in Europe but NATO's expansion into Central and Eastern Europe prompted Moscow to join the NATO Russia Council in 2002. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was followed by a division among European countries : while France, Germany and Russia opposed the outbreak of this conflict, Great Britain, Spain and Italy, as well as many Central and Eastern European countries that had recently joined NATO, such as Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, joined the coalition led by Washington.

The United States' hubris led not only to military operations with disastrous consequences in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of the "war on terror", but also to an expansion of its influence and of NATO, whose effects destabilised Europe, spurred dangerous competition between Washington and Moscow, and revived frozen conflicts (as between Georgia on the one hand and South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other), or created new ones (as in Ukraine). After the wars in Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Macedonia, the United States extended its influence through the expansion of NATO and the 'coloured' revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. The crisis in the relations with Russia also intensified in the 2000s with Washington's desire to deploy an anti-missile shield in Poland. The growing convergence between American strategic interests and those of the EU has widened the gap with Russia over the years. The Orange Revolution revealed the political divisions within Ukrainian society and the need to find a political balance within the country, as well as on the European continent. This lesson was not learnt, even though the conflict in Yugoslavia constituted a stark precedent: during the Maïdan events and the serious political crisis that followed in Ukraine, the EU failed to enforce the political transition agreement and the new government put in place under US control encouraged internal polarisation, followed by the reaction of Russia, leading to an armed conflict in the Donbass. Similarly, the unwillingness of the "Western partners" to enforce the Minsk I and II agreements failed to resolve a conflict that escalated following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This war is not only a catastrophe for the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, but also a threat to other neighboring European peoples should the conflict spread and escalate, with the nuclear option as one possible outcome.

BRICS and multipolarity: perspectives and limits

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, followed by the Taliban takeover in late summer 2021, and the international consequences of the conflict in Ukraine point to a decline in US power and the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar system. It became increasingly apparent that the "international community" was in fact limited to the Western powers or interests and that the "rest of the world" was moving away from it, as shown by the growing number of applications to join the BRICS. The BRICS have distinguished themselves over the last 20 years by their growth rates and their ability to develop an alternative vision of the international system. This vision, which has become increasingly critical of Western influence on the international system, has acquired a certain weight in the geopolitical balance of power and has become attractive to the countries of the South through the role played by Russia and China as opponents of the Western model.

The BRICS are demonstrating their ability to challenge Western hegemony over the international system, and this potential may grow, particularly with the increasing membership of countries from the South. However, the BRICS also have their limits, such as the differences in power, interests and vision of international order between its 4 original members. In addition, serious diplomatic problems and conflicts persist between some of the original members, such as China and India, as well as between potential future members such as Algeria and Morocco. Russia and China are in a geopolitical confrontation with the United States, while India is the focus of US attention, particularly in the context of the Quad, in which Australia and Japan are also participating.

The BRICS and their supporters could play a role in establishing a multipolar world and more effective multilateralism through a reform of the United Nations Security Council, but this is only one scenario among many. The growing role of the BRICS and the refusal of Western countries to accept this new geopolitical order could also perpetuate logic of confrontation between blocs. Because of the weight of certain members such as India, Russia and China, as well as their own interests or divergent visions, the BRICS could lose cohesion in the long term and become an arena for confrontations between major powers.

Imperialism has been Western, but in the future it could be Chinese or other. During the Cold War, the People’s Republic of China supported anti-colonial and independence movements in Asia and Africa, and then condemned Western interference in the countries of the South. China continues to officially defend a vision that emphasises cooperation and sovereignty, particularly in its trade and economic development policy with Africa. China has criticised Western coups d'état and interventions on the African continent in the past, but given the importance of its investments, markets and strategic resources in Africa, Beijing could use the same methods in the future to defend its interests there. After the dependency created by debt and the unequal terms of economic and trade exchanges between North and South, Beijing's economic development policy has also created a new dependency and a loss of sovereignty for certain developing countries (Cameroon, Congo, Bangladesh, etc.). Nor has China called globalisation and capitalism[4] into question, but the "factory of the world" has become its main driving force, and in the event of a severe crisis in China or a Sino-American conflict, the consequences would be disastrous for the world economy.

Conclusion: considerations on sovereignty and neutrality

In a world that has been and remains an arena between great powers, weaker, smaller or ethno linguistically or religiously fragmented countries often fall victim to the ambitions of their more powerful neighbours or to conflicts between more powerful neighbours (by being partitioned and annexed or becoming the scene of proxy wars or "frozen conflicts"). Adapting and surviving between large blocs is not easy, but small countries, or those willing to remain truly independent, can choose the path of sovereignty through neutrality. In many cases, neutrality has been imposed (Belgium, Switzerland, Finland, Austria) and in Europe neutrality has lost ground following the conflict in Ukraine (Switzerland, Finland and potentially Sweden joining NATO after ratification by all NATO members), but the concept remains relevant in the current context. Neutrality enables a country to reject the logic of confrontation between blocs (as with the Non-Aligned Movement), to remain free, to defend its own interests and an alternative or specific vision of international relations. These elements enable a neutral country to be a credible place for peace negotiations where conflicts can be settled, a role played by Switzerland since Saint Nicolas de Flüe in the 15th century. By virtue of its geographical position, a neutral country acts as a buffer zone, making it possible to avoid conflict between blocs and to maintain a distance between the nuclear missiles of competing blocs (which increases warning time). Finally, neutrality enables a country to enjoy peace and prosperity by acting as a bridge between its major neighbours (which was the case for Switzerland and could have been the case for Ukraine).


  1. Aymeric Chauprade, Chronique du choc des civilisations, Éditions Chronique, 2011 ; Henri de Grossouvre, Paris Berlin-Moscou : La voie de l'indépendance et de la paix, L’Âge d’Homme, 2002.
  2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, 1997
  3. As was the case with the European Energy Charter of 1994, which was succeeded by the Energy Charter Treaty in 1998. The latter was ruled incompatible with EU laws by the Court of Justice of the European Union in September 2021. Spain, France, Poland and many other European states have announced their intention to withdraw from the Treaty in 2022. The European Commission announced in February 2023 that withdrawal from the Treaty by all EU members was inevitable. See « LEAK: Exit from Energy Charter Treaty ‘unavoidable’, EU Commission says », Euractiv, 08/02/2023 : https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/exit-from-energy charter-treaty-unavoidable-eu-commission-says
  4. The People's Republic of China developed its "socialist market economy" following the reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and thanks to Western investment, particularly from the United States. In the 1990s, Bill Clinton's administration supported China's economic development and its accession to the WTO (effective in 2001). The "social credit" introduced in China was inspired by a Chinese delegation that had visited the United States of America and discovered a system of information on the financial status of customers of banks and credit institutions. The Chinese authorities quickly realised the potential of such a system to control and regulate the social, economic and political behaviour of their citizens.

Poza de profil

Gilles-Emmanuel Jacquet

Mr. Gilles-Emmanuel Jacquet is an annalist of international relations.